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Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?
by
MARK A. LEMLEY* & COLLEEN V. CHIEN **

Introduction
The United States is the only country in the world that awards
patents to the first person to invent something, rather than the first to
file a patent application. In order to determine who is first to invent,
the United States has created an elaborate set of “interference”
proceedings and legal standards to define invention and decide how
it may be proven. Supporters of this system claim that it is necessary
to protect small inventors, who may not have the resources to file
patent applications quickly, and may therefore lose a patent race to
large companies who invented after they did. 1 Advocates of global
* Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley; of
counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP.
** Associate, Fenwick & West.
We would like to thank Jim Hirabayashi at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) for his significant assistance in collecting small entity data, Dale Shaw at
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for his helpful explanations of the
BPAI’s processes and procedures, and Bob Cooter, Rose Hagan, Jay Kesan, Arti
Rai, and Jay Thomas as well as participants at the University of Washington High
Technology Protection Summit, the Intellectual Property Scholars’ Conference,
and a workshop at the Haas School of Business, University of California at
Berkeley for helpful discussions and comments on an earlier draft.
1
See, e.g., Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent
System, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 263 (1995); 140 CONG. REC. H11,450, 11,456
(daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statements of Reps. Bentley & Rohrabacher opposing
harmonization as demanded by Japan and permitting big Japanese and
multinational corporations to steal the patent rights of American inventors); John
Paul Baremore, Don’t Shoot the Messenger: Congress and the Prospect of Patent
Harmonization, 44 LOYOLA L. REV. 761, 781 n.101 (1999) (reprinting a letter from
many Nobel laureates arguing that patent harmonization will hurt small inventors);
Jeffrey E. Robertson, If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: The Unnecessary Scope of
Patent Reform as Embodied in the “21st Century Patent System Improvement Act”
and “The Omnibus Patent Act of 1997,” 5 J. INTELL . PROP . L. 573 (1998). For
[1]
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patent harmonization have suggested, however, that the first inventor
is usually also the first to file, 2 and that the first-to-invent standard is
unnecessary and wasteful. 3
In this Article, we study U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO ”) interference proceedings and court cases in which the
parties dispute who is first to invent. We find that the first person to
file is usually, but by no means always, also the first to invent. In
over 40% of the cases, the first to invent is last to file. We also find
that the long-standing rule that discriminated against foreign
inventors by requiring proof of inventive activity in the U.S. had
surprisingly little effect on outcomes; that a large number of priority
disputes involve near-simultaneous invention; and that the vast
majority of such disputes could be resolved without reliance on much
of the evidence the law permits. Finally, we study the role of small
inventors to see whether they are disproportionately the beneficiaries
of the first to invent system. While the evidence is mixed, it does not
appear that small inventors particularly benefit from the first to
invent system.
Part I describes the legal background for the international debate
over how to determine patent priority. Part II describes our studies
and discusses our results in detail. Finally, Part III draws
conclusions for policy-makers from the data. There is some truth to
the arguments of both sides in this debate. The first to invent system
other arguments in favor of the first to invent system, see Kevin Cuenot, Perilous
Potholes in the Path Towards Patent Law Harmonization, 11 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 101, 114 (1999).
On the other hand, a recent study by the General Accounting Office found that
more than 70% of small businesses supported patent harmonization as a way to
reduce the aggregate costs of worldwide intellectual property protection. United
States General Accounting Office, Federal Action Needed to Help Small
Businesses Address Foreign Patent Challenges 1 (July 2002).
2
See, e.g., The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992: Hearings on H.R. 4978S.2605, Joint Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property and Administration of Justice, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1992)
(statement of Robert P. Merges).
3
See, e.g., Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-to-Invent
Principle From a Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure §102
Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2002) (arguing that the
differences between the systems are smaller than generally perceived, and that a
first to file system would not substantially change U.S. law); Peter A. Jackman,
Adoption of a First to File Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT . L. REV. 67
(1997). But cf. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002) (questioning the value of patent harmonization,
though not specifically the efficiency of first to file).
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does produce significantly different results in individual cases than a
first to file system would. But it is not clear that those different
results are particularly fairer, or that they are worth the cost. We
suggest some possible ways to modify the U.S. system to take
account of these facts without changing entirely to a first-to-file
system.
I. The Politics of Patent Harmonization
The United States has long been a maverick in the intellectual
property world. We spent most of our history as a pirate nation, 4
with rules that intentionally discriminated against foreign intellectual
property in order to benefit domestic industries. 5 Besides intentional
discrimination, U.S. intellectual property rules are frequently at odds
with those in the rest of the world. The U.S. failed to adhere to the
Berne Convention for almost 100 years because we did not want to
relinquish our insistence on the formalities of notice, registration,
publication and deposit in copyright. 6 Even after U.S. adherence to
Berne in 1989, the United States failed to adopt effective protection
for moral rights, as the rest of the world does and as Berne requires. 7
In trademark, the United States is one of the only nations to require
proof of use in commerce rather than trademark registration for proof
of priority. 8 There are other, more subtle differences, such as the
1. See, e.g., ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT : CASES
AND MATERIALS 9, 10 (1999) (describing the U.S. as a “pirate nation” for the first
century of its existence); JAMES J. BARNES, A UTHORS, PUBLISHERS AND
POLITICIANS: THE QUEST FOR AN ANGLO-A MERICAN COPYRIGHT A GREEMENT ,
1815-1854 (Ohio State University Press, 1974) (describing this history in detail);
Peter Yu, The Copyright Divide: A Comparative Inquiry into the Causes of
Massive Copyright Piracy (working paper 2002).
5. For discriminatory provisions in U.S. IP law, see domestic production
requirements in copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 601 (2002). See also, onerous rules for
notice and local registration that forced many foreign copyright owners to forego
protection in the U.S. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 405, 407, 408 (2000); see also, rules that
gave priority to inventions made in the U.S. rather than abroad. 35 U.S.C. §
102(g) (2000). To some extent those rules are still in force. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
102(a), (b) (2000) (favoring prior use within the U.S.); §102(g) (2000) (focusing
on use within the U.S. for some kinds of priority contests).
6. The Berne Convention was promulgated in 1891, but the U.S. did not
adhere to it until 1989. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853-2861 (1988).
7. E.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of
International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST . L.J. 733,
740-41 (2001).
8. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American
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rather more expansive nature of the U.S. fair use doctrine in
copyright than its European “fair dealing” counterpart. 9 These
differences have made international harmonization of intellectual
property laws more difficult, though a number of strides have
recently been made in that regard. 10
Similar disparities have impeded even first steps towards
harmonization in patent law. U.S. law has long differed in
fundamental ways from the rules in the rest of the world. The U.S.
traditionally awarded patents for 17 years from the date of the patent
grant, while the rest of the world protected patents from the date of
grant until 20 years after the application was initially filed. 11 The
U.S. until recently kept all patent applications secret, while the rest
of the world publishes them 18 months after filing. 12 The U.S. gives
a one-year grace period to inventors who publish or put their
invention on sale, while Europe requires that a patent application be
filed before any such activity. 13 Europe has a system of prior user
rights to protect those who independently develop an invention and
begin using it before a patent issues; the U.S. has no analogous

Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 W AKE FOREST L. REV.
827, 859-62 & n.121 (2000). In 1988, the U.S. changed its law to permit the filing
of a trademark application based on an intent to use a mark in commerce.
However, the PTO will not register a trademark until actual use has commenced.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)-(c) (2000).
9. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic
Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 233-34 & n.49 (1998)
(noting the narrower nature of fair dealing and other foreign fair use counterparts).
10. U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention in 1989 enabled copyright owners
in most countries of the world to obtain “national treatment” in all other member
countries. Substantive minimum protection was further solidified by the 1994
GATT TRIPs agreement. On the trademark front, the slow but steady progress of
the Madrid Protocol, an adjunct to the Madrid Agreement that is designed to
include the U.S., has brought harmonization tantalizingly close.
11. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2), 154 (c)(1) (2000).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000). The provision for publication of
applications after 18 months was added by the American Inventors Protection Act
in 1999. It does not apply to patentees who chooses only to file an application in
the U.S. Id.
13. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) with the “absolute novelty” rule in Europe.
John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward
Property Rights in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT ’L ECON. L. 735, 76061 (1999); Michael N. Meller, Commentary on the Future Including the Need and
Possibility of a Global Patent, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 605, 611 (2000) (describing and
criticizing the absolute novelty rule). Japan, by contrast, has a six-month grace
period.
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system. 14 The U.S. law generally does not provide a way for
competitors to oppose a patent in an administrative setting; most
other countries have well-established opposition procedures. 15
A few of these differences have disappeared – or at least
lessened – in recent years. 16 But by far the most significant
difference remains: the U.S. grants patents to the first person to
invent, while the rest of the world gives a patent to the first person to
file a patent application on a particular invention. 17 The difference
14. While Congress in 1999 adopted a “prior inventor” defense, it is extremely
limited. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3) (2000). It applies only to business method patents,
and protects only those parties who were using the invention before the patentee
invented it. By contrast, European prior user rights apply to all sorts of inventions,
and cover uses that began after the patentee’s invention but before the patent was
published.
15. The U.S. law has long permitted any party to submit a patent for
reexamination, but a third party who does so has no opportunity to participate in
the subsequent administrative process. 35 U.S.C. §§304-305 (2000). Congress
recently enacted an inter partes opposition statute, but it has such shortcomings
that virtually no one seems willing to use it. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2000). For a
description of those shortcomings, see 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2000); Mark D. Janis,
Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP ., MEDIA & ENT .
L.J. 481 (2000). For a suggestion that the entire idea of post-grant oppositions is
inferior to pre-grant oppositions, see Jay A. Kesan, Carrot and Sticks to Create a
Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 776-83 (2002).
One feature of U.S. law does create a limited sort of opposition system.
Because the PTO can declare an interference with an issued patent for up to a year
after issue, 35 U.S.C. §135 (2000), it is possible for a junior party who learns of a
newly issued patent to file a patent application with claims identical to the newly
issued patent, thus “provoking” an interference. This is not a classic opposition
system, because it allows a challenge only on the basis that the junior party itself
invented first, not the ground that the senior party’s patent is invalid for some other
reason. But it does permit administrative challenges to issued patents in some
circumstances.
16. For example, the U.S. patent law now includes a 20-year term, 18-month
publication, a limited prior user right, and an inter partes opposition procedure. 35
U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 122(b), 271, 311-18 (2000). In each case, however, Congress
so watered down the new provisions that they bear little resemblance to their
foreign counterparts. Thus, the 20-year term is riddled with extensions, 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(b) (2000); 18-month publication is required only for inventors who also file
abroad, 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(B) (2000); the prior user right applies only to
business method patents, and even then only in extreme cases, 35 U.S.C. §
273(b)(3); and the opposition procedure is anemic, see supra note 15.
17. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 104 (2000) with the European system, under
which the first applicant to file is entitled to the patent. See, e.g., Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
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between the “first to invent” and “first to file” systems not only
means that in some cases different people will own patents on the
same invention in different countries, but also leads to radical
differences in procedure.
The U.S. has an elaborate legal
mechanism, both in the PTO and in the courts, for determining who
was first to invent. 18 The rest of the world has no analogous process.
Unless the U.S. is willing to abandon the first to invent system – or
unless it can persuade the rest of the world to abandon first to file 19 –
we will never have a truly international patent system. 20
Debates over international patent harmonization may seem
abstract and technical.
In fact, however, they have proven
extraordinarily divisive and politically charged. Beginning with the
shift to the 20-year patent term21 , a loose coalition of political
conservatives and small inventors have challenged the process of
patent reform, arguing that harmonization is a tool of large
corporations and foreigners that unfairly disadvantages individual
inventors. 22 This small inventor coalition has had substantial success
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
371, 387 n.142 (2002); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the Intellectual
Property Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 421, 444
n.110; Donald S. Chisum, Intoduction, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437 (1993).
Noted patent historian Ed Walterscheid argues that the U.S. first to invent system
was a historical accident that arose from competing claims to a patent on the
steamboat in different states during the founding of the Republic. Edward C.
Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a "Firstto-Invent" Patent System, 23 A M. INTELL. PROP . L. A SS'N Q.J. 263, 291-92 (1995).
18. The PTO administers “interference” proceedings between two or more
applicants who claim to be the first to invent. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2000). In addition,
a patent may be challenged in court on the grounds that the patentee was not the
first to invent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
19. The momentum is in the other direction. Even those few countries who
once had a first to invent system, such as the Philippines, have abandoned it. See
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System has Provided No
Advantage to Small Entities, 88 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFC. SOC’Y 425, 425 n.1
(2002).
20
See, e.g., Anneliese M. Siefert, Will the United States Take the Plunge into
Global Patent Law Harmonization? A Discussion of the United States’ Past,
Present, and Future Harmonization Efforts, 6 M ARQUETTE INTELL. PROP . REV.
173, 184 (2002) (calling agreement on first to file the “cornerstone” of patent
harmonization).
21
35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2).
22. E.g., Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent
System, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 263 (1995); 140 CONG. REC. H11,450, 11,456
(daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statements of Reps. Bentley & Rohrabacher opposing
harmonization as demanded by Japan and permitting big Japanese and
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in blunting initiatives for harmonization. 23 Their arguments delayed
adoption of the American Inventors Protection Act for several years,
and watered down a number of its provisions. 24
The central battle between small and large inventors has been
over first to file. 25 To simplify, those who advocate a first to file
system point to the savings that would result from avoiding the cost
and delay of interference and priority proceedings. By contrast, first
to invent advocates claim that a first to file system unfairly
disadvantages individuals and small companies, who may not be able
to get a patent application on file as easily their larger counterparts.
This policy debate centers on disputed questions of fact. Do first
inventors in fact file second? If not, there is not much point to the
first to invent system. Are small entities likely to be the ones who
take advantage of the process? If not, the fairness arguments raised
by small inventors are less persuasive.
Our objective in this paper is to shed some evidentiary light on
this debate. We study both the outcomes of interference and priority
proceedings and the entity status of participants in those proceedings.
We discuss our findings in detail in the following section.

multinational corporations to steal the patent rights of American inventors); James
J. Barta Jr., Death of a Superior Intellectual Property Law System, 17 ST . L. U.
PUB. L. REV. 383 (1998). For a discussion of the political debate, see John F.
Duffy et al., Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the Legal
and Economic Effects of Purchasing Patent Applications After Eighteen Months of
Filing, 16 CARDOZO A RTS & ENT . L.J. 601, 604 (1998); Stephanie Gore, “Eureka!
But I Filed Too Late . . .”: The Harm-Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent
System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 293; Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical
Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994). It is one of the
curious facts of patent politics that conservative politicians are arguing that big
companies are conspiring to hijack the political process, while liberals are
defending the interests of those corporations.
23. On the power of the small inventor as an icon, see Mark D. Janis, Patent
Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 910 (2002).
24. Id. at 918-19 (changes in the AIPA “bear the unmistakable influence of
lobbying on behalf of independent inventors.”). For a discussion of the watereddown provisions, see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
25
See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Harmonization of International Patent Law,
26 J. M ARSHALL L. REV. 437, 440 (1993); Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now
– The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C. J. INT ’L L. & COM. RE G. 291, 300
(1995) (attributing the Clinton Administration’s refusal to push first to file to its
fear of upsetting small inventors).
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II. Who Files – and Who Wins – Priority Contests?
A. Our Data
We collected two different datasets for purposes of this study.
First, we collected reported decisions involving priority disputes for
the period of 1990 through 2001. Specifically, we included final
adjudications on priority reported on either Lexis or Westlaw and
made by the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI) or by a federal court. 26 We identified cases with keyword
searching, using the terms, “102(g)” and “priority,” and found 118
such reported opinions. 27 Eighteen of those decisions were not pure
decisions on the merits, but procedural or intermediate rulings (such
as a denial of a preliminary injunction) that did not ultimately resolve
the priority issue. This left 100 “clean” cases to consider. Of these
cases, 76 were actually decided by determining who the first inventor
was. The remaining 24 cases were decided on grounds that did not
require resolution of the priority dispute. In all but one case, this was
because the adjudicator determined that the two inventions were not
identical. 28
For each of these cases, we determined who adjudicated the
case, whether the junior or senior party won, 29 the grounds on which
they won, 30 when (in the period) the decision was rendered, the
26. Specifically, we included in the “court” category decisions by the Federal
Circuit, the federal district courts, the International Trade Commission (ITC) or the
Court of Claims.
27. 26 of the 118 total cases were from the BPAI, 52 were from a federal
district court, 35 were from the Federal Circuit, and the remaining 5 were from the
ITC or the Court of Claims. Where a case was litigated at multiple levels, we
report the appellate rather than the board or district court result.
28. In the one other case, no clear basis was provided by the court.
29. Throughout, we refer to the senior party as the first to file an application
and the junior party as the second to file.
30. The possible grounds we identified were: (1) a non-priority basis, e.g. that
the two inventions were not identical (2) that the winner was first to reduce to
practice, (3) the winner was first to conceive but last to reduce to practice, (4) the
losing party lacked diligence, (5) the losing party abandoned, suppressed or
concealed the invention, and (6) another basis or no listed basis. In a number of
cases, the finder of fact ruled on two or more of these grounds. In such a
circumstance, we classified the case in the category which most clearly represented
the grounds for victory.
In addition, we also categorized these bases into circumstances in which a
party won by its own efforts (proof of earlier reduction to practice or proof of
conception plus diligence) and those in which a party won due to the other’s
negligence (lack of diligence or abandonment, suppression or concealment).
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evidence each party relied upon, 31 relevant dates of senior and junior
invention where available, and whether there was a foreign inventor.
For appellate decisions, we also noted the source of the decision
below and whether it was affirmed or reversed.
This first data set is a population study, rather than a sample.
That is, we did not select a few cases at random from a larger group.
Rather, our data include all the cases that meet our criteria – a
written decision available online that produced a clear winner. As a
result, there is no need to predict the characteristics of a larger
population; we have determined its characteristics. 32
Our second dataset involved only interference proceedings
available on the BPAI website. The BPAI website 33 provides some
but not all board decisions, both published and unpublished, from
approximately 1997 until the present. There are approximately 7,000
decisions indexed on the BPAI web page, but only several hundred
were interference decisions. 34
We randomly selected 190
interference decisions from this group, and attempted to determine
the nature of the entities involved in the interference. We used two
different methodologies to identify entity status. First, in the subset
of cases in which the PTO could provide us with small entity data, 35
we classified the applicants into the statutory categories of
individual, small business, non-profit group, and large business. In
an independent analysis we also attempted to determine small entity
status by observation, assuming that unassigned patents belonged to
individual inventors and that non-public companies should be
31. The categories here were (1) a senior party won by relying on its filing date,
(2) a senior party won by relying on earlier proof of reduction to practice, (3) the
senior party relied on conception date, (4) the senior party relied on both
conception date and reduction to practice, (5) the junior party relied on reduction to
practice, and (6) the junior party relied on both conception and reduction to
practice.
32. Of course, the relevant population is priority disputes decided between 1990
and 2001. It is not necessarily predictive of the outcome of future cases.
33. http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/bpai.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2003).
34
There are more decisions here than in our population study because many BPAI
decisions are not published and because the BPAI database includes resolution of
cases short of actual determination of the priority question, for example by
procedural default.
35. For privacy reasons, the PTO only releases small entity data for applications
that mature into patents. However to avoid biasing our database by only including
the status of “winners,” we gathered status data where the particular application
matured into a patent and where an application was associated with a parent patent
for which data was available.
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considered small businesses. 36 We also attempted to determine
which party initiated the interference, whether parties of like size
were matched against each other, whether the interference went to
litigation, and the outcome when it did go to litigation. 37 We present
the results of both studies in the next section.
B. Results
(1) Junior vs. Senior Winners
(a) First Inventors in Litigated Cases are Often Last to File
Who wins interferences has been a matter of significant debate.
The central justification for the first to invent system is a judgment
that the first inventor may not be the first to file a patent application.
If there were no variance between the results of the two systems,
there would be no reason to undertake the cost and delay of a priority
inquiry. Advocates of a first to file system occasionally suggest that
there is essentially no benefit to the first to invent system because
few first inventors are in fact second to file.38 Some of these
statements are based on statistical assumptions that are dubious at
best. 39 The data suggests that interferences are litigated to judgment
36. This methodology is imperfect for several reasons.
Some patent
applications that are not assigned at the time of filing are later assigned before
issuance. Some patent applications may have been assigned but their assignment
was not reported by the BPAI in its opinion. And some large companies are not
publicly traded, and so will improperly be listed as small companies.
37. Because this is a sample study, we are necessarily trying to predict the
characteristics of the larger population of all interference proceedings.
Unfortunately, because the cases on which we have entity status data may not be
random, we cannot predict with statistical confidence that the results of our sample
are representative of the population of overall interference proceedings.
38. See, e.g., Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First to File Patent System: A
Proposal, 26 U. BALT . L. REV. Summer 1997, at 67, 84 (arguing that 99.9% of
cases don’t involve priority disputes, and in most cases the outcome is the same
anyway);
Interview
with
TECH
TRIB:
Todd
Dickinson,
at
http://www.ct.org/News/TechTribune.asp?Path=3 (same). Cf. Charles L. Gholz,
First-to-File or First-to-Invent?, 82 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 891 (2000)
(supporting first to file system for other reasons).
39. For example, Dickinson argues that 99% of all priority disputes are resolved
on the basis of who is first to file. cite. But he assumes that any case in which
there is no priority challenge was in fact a victory for the first filer. This is wrong.
In the vast majority of patents there is no priority contest at all, and so no one to
lose. Only in the subset of cases in which priority is actually disputed can we
judge the relationship between filing and invention.
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in about the same percentage of applications as infringement suits are
litigated to judgment once a patent issues. 40 So the fact that there are
relatively few interference decisions does not prove that there are no
priority contests any more than the fact that there are even fewer
patent infringement decisions proves that there is no infringement
occurring in the world. Rather, it demonstrates only that in
administrative as well as judicial settings, relatively few parties take
their disputes all the way to court.
In fact, notwithstanding these extravagant claims that the system
doesn’t matter, our data show that junior parties won a surprisingly
large percentage of the cases litigated to judgment in the last ten
years. The data are presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
OUTCOME OF PRIORITY CONTESTS BY SENIOR STATUS
JR. V. SR. STATS
Total Clean Cases
Jr.
Sr.
All Cases
100
33
67
Apellate Cases
30
16
14
Dist Ct Cases
44
10
34
BPAI Cases
26
7
19
^True Priority Contests 76
33
43

^True Priority Contests = Clean cases excluding cases decided
on the basis that the 2 inventions are not identical or where no
basis for decision is provided

JR. V. SR. %
All Cases
Apellate Cases
Dist Ct Cases
BPAI Cases
^True Priority Contests

Total Cases
100%
30%
44%
26%
76%

Jr.
33%
53%
23%
27%
43%

Sr.
67%
47%
77%
73%
57%

40. Only about 2% of all patents are ever litigated, and only 0.2% of all patents
actually go to trial. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 NW . U. L. RE V. 1495, 1501 (2001). Similarly, Gerald Mossinghofff
reports that 2,858 interference cases [representing at least 5,700 applications, since
each interference includes two or more patent applications] went to decision
between 1983 and 2000. Mossinghoff, supra note 19, at 427. This represents
about 0.25% of all the applications filed during that period. [Mossinghoff’s lower
statistic reported in text—0.1%—is incorrect because he does not account for the
multiple applications that are necessarily at issue in any interference.]
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Of the 100 cases in our population that have final outcomes,
junior parties won 33, or 33%. More significantly, in the 76 cases
that are actually resolved on priority grounds, junior parties won 33,
or 43%. 41 Thus, it seems that when priority is actually adjudicated,
the first to invent is quite frequently not the first to file. 42
Table 1 also breaks the cases down by the type of adjudicator.
Interestingly, junior parties are more likely to prevail the higher the
tribunal they encounter. Of the 26 BPAI decisions in our dataset,
only 7 (or 27%) were decided in favor of the junior party. Of the 41
district court decisions, only 10 (or 24%) were decided in favor of
the junior party. Of the 30 Federal Circuit decisions, fully 16 (or
53%) were decided in favor of the junior party. These results are
particularly striking given that the burden of proof is heavier on the
junior inventor in court cases that challenge the validity of a patent
than in Board cases that adjudicate rights between two applicants. 43
The absence of a difference between BPAI and district court
decisions may also provide some weak evidence against the use of
specialized trial courts in patent cases:44 the specialized judges of
41. Most of the remaining 24 nonpriority cases are ones in which the
adjudicator ultimately determined that the two inventions were not identical, and
so there was no interference. It also includes a few cases in which the junior
party’s invention was unpatentable for reasons unrelated to priority. In these cases,
the senior party is the winner, but the cases shed no light on who was the first to
invent.
42. These results are almost identical to the only other study on the issue,
published 15 years ago, which found that junior filers won priority disputes 42.7%
of the time. See Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-File, Mandatory
Reexamination, and Mandatory “Exceptional Circumstances”: Ideas for Better?
Or Worse?, 69 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 595, 602 (1987).
43. This is a function of the statutory presumption of validity, which can only
be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Apple
Computer v. Articulate Systems, 234 F.3d 14, 26 (Fed. Cir. 2000). By contrast,
interference proceedings between applicants place a lower burden of proof on the
junior party. See Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Not all Board cases involve two applicants, however; junior parties can
challenge issued patents at the Board for one year after publication or issue. 35
U.S.C. § 135(b). Further, some of the appellate cases involve appeals from Board
decisions rather than district court cases, and so involve the lower burden of proof.
Of the 30 clean, priority-based Federal Circuit decisions in our study, 10 were
appeals from interference proceedings and 20 were appeals from district court
102(g) decisions.
44. For a suggestion that specialized trial courts should be used in patent cases,
see Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2002).
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the BPAI don’t appear to reach different outcomes than judges and
juries in the court system at large.
(b) Litigation Selection Effects Cannot Explain Our Findings
Before concluding that first inventors are often last to file,
however, we should consider another possible explanation: that the
outcomes are an artifact of litigation selection effects. In an
influential article, Priest and Klein suggested that cases should be
litigated to judgment only where they are close enough or the law
uncertain enough that the parties vary in their assessment of the
chance of winning. 45 In the absence of asymmetric information or
asymmetric stakes, they predict that plaintiffs will win litigated cases
about 50% of the time. 46 There is significant evidence suggesting
that the Priest/Klein hypothesis does not effectively predict outcomes
in many sorts of cases, 47 including substantial variance from the 50%
norm in both patent validity and infringement decisions 48 as well as
45. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD . 1 (1984). Interferences should have roughly
symmetric stakes, since both parties are competing to be awarded a patent of
identical scope and no damage awards are possible. Validity litigation may have
different characteristics. Other classic literature on selection for trial includes
I.P.L. P’ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539
(1983); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); Kathryn Spier, The Dynamics of
Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD . 93 (1992).
46. Priest & Klein, supra note 45, at 5, 17.
47. For a review of the economic literature offering limitations and
qualifications to the Priest-Klein hypothesis, see, e.g., Robert B. Cooter & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J.
ECON. LIT . 1067, 1074-75 (1989). See also Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process
As a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD . 379 (1995); Samuel
Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29
FLA. ST . U. L. REV. 1265, 1273-74 (2002). But see Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling
Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.
L. & ECON. 451, 452 (1998) (“Considerable evidence supports the main prediction
of the” Priest-Klein model).
48. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251-2 (1998) (patentees win validity 54%
of the time, but decisions vary greatly by factfinder and procedural posture);
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 M ICH. L. REV. 365, 385, 407 (2000) (patentees win at trial in
58% of all cases; also noting that declaratory judgment plaintiffs win substantially
more than similarly situated parties who do not file suit first). The Priest/Klein
hypothesis also has difficulty explaining the substantial change in patent validity
litigation outcomes over time. See Allison & Lemley, supra, at 205-6 n.53
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in other sorts of cases. 49 Further, Priest & Klein have difficulty
explaining why decisions on appeal are systematically more likely to
affirm than to reverse. 50
Our data seem difficult to square with the Priest/Klein
hypothesis. BPAI and district court decisions show a substantial bias
in favor of the senior party, while appellate outcomes are roughly
evenly divided. 51 One possible explanation is the presence of private
(validity rate increased from 35% to 54% after the creation of the Federal Circuit).
For economic analysis of decisions to litigate in the patent context, see, e.g.,
Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Enforcement
of Patent Rights in the United States, working paper 2002; Deepak Somaya, My
Strategy Says “See You in Court!” Determinants of Decisions not to Settle Patent
Litigation in Computers and Research Medicines, working paper 2001.
49. E.g., Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality,
and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 576 (2002) (plaintiffs win only 16% of
medical antitrust cases, and only 9% of staff privilege cases); Andrew T. Guzman,
Litigation and Settlement at the WTO (working paper 2002) (finding that
complainants win 90% of all WTO panel disputes, and offering a model to explain
this asymmetry).
50. In general, trial decisions are affirmed about 70-75% of the time on
mandatory review. See, e.g., J. W OODFORD HOWARD JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH AND DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS (1981); Donald R. Songer et al., Do the “Haves” Come
Out Ahead Over Time? Applying Galanter’s Framework to Decisions of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y RE V. 811, 819 tbl.2 (1999).
Indeed, the affirmance bias is so strong that evidence that the Federal Circuit
reverses about 1/3 of all claim constructions, see Christian A. Chu, Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001), Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped
to Resolve Patent Cases, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2001), created a firestorm
of complaints that the reversal rate was too high. Under a Priest/Klein model, it is
difficult to explain why parties likely to lose on appeal haven’t settled. There may
be other explanations, of course: appeals are not nearly as costly as trials, and the
appellant may see the delay associated with the appeal as a benefit.
The numbers are different where review is discretionary, of course, as in
many Supreme Courts. Courts that can choose which cases to take are more likely
to review opinions that are controversial or with which they disagree. See, e.g.,
James E. Bond & Kelly Kunsch, A State Supreme Court in Transition, 25 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 545, 549 (2002).
51. One conclusion from our data that is consistent with Priest/Klein, supra
note 45, is the fact that burden of proof seems to make little difference to the
outcome of cases actually litigated. Even though 102(g) challenges in court must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, while interference claims made
against patent applications need only be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence, the junior user win rate is similar in both sets of cases. This suggests
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information about valuation. While parties to an interference
proceeding must disclose the information they possess about
inventorship during discovery, they do not have to disclose how
much they value the possibility of obtaining a patent. 52 The lack of
such information may impede settlement. But if so, it is an effect we
would expect to see only in interference cases, not in 102(g)
disputes. In the latter set of cases the patent has already issued and
infringement is being litigated, so its value should be clearer.
Further, in litigation the parties must disclose information related to
damages, making it easier for each side to assess the other’s expected
outcome value. Since both the BPAI and the district courts have
about the same junior party win rates, this explanation is
unsatisfying.
If there is some information failure that systematically leads
parties not to settle interferences, it is reasonable to expect that senior
parties should prevail in the majority of the resulting trials, since they
have an obvious evidentiary advantage. As Table 1 demonstrates,
that is in fact what occurs. But it is harder to explain why appellate
decisions are divided evenly between senior and junior parties, and
why there is no difference between BPAI and district court outcomes
despite the rather different legal standards and procedural postures.
We don’t have a good explanation for this discrepancy. It seems as
though standard economic theories of litigation are inconsistent in
predicting the results in our dataset. This should raise a cautionary
flag for those who place much reliance on such theories.
(c) Will a First to File System Change This Result?
One argument made by advocates of a first to file system is that
first inventors who are last to file under the U.S. system would have
an incentive to file more quickly under a first to file system. Thus,
the argument goes, those first inventors would not necessarily be
disadvantaged by the switch to a first to file system, because they
would file more quickly and therefore might end up being the first to
file.
We are not persuaded. It is certainly true that a first to file
system gives inventors an incentive to get a patent application on file
early. But it gives such an incentive to all inventors. Inventors file
that some sort of selection effect may be occurring. Alternatively, factfinders may
simply disregard burdens of proof.
52. As Cooter and Ulen point out, however, parties have an incentive to
disclose self-serving information, so incomplete disclosure of information is likely
to make both sides unduly pessimistic, not optimistic, and therefore encourage
settlement. See ROBERT C. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 39092 (3d ed. 2000).
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their applications under a “veil of ignorance.” They don’t know
whether they are first or second to invent, nor when their opponent
might be expected to file. Thus, under a first to file system every
inventor will be encouraged to file her patent application as early as
possible. There is no reason to believe that those who are first to
invent but last to file under the current system would be more
affected by this incentive. 53
Further, inventors already have
significant incentives to file patent applications early. The rest of the
world uses a first to file system, so any inventor who wants
protection outside the U.S. already has an incentive to file early. 54
And section 102(b) punishes inventors who delay filing by
expanding the categories of prior art that may invalidate the patent to
include sale or publication by the inventor herself. 55 While it is fair
to say that a first to file system will give everyone some additional
incentive to file early, there is no reason to believe it will affect first
inventors more than second inventors.
(2) Grounds for Victory
Priority disputes are complex creatures, with a morass of legal
rules that are grist for the mill of patent law classes. 56 We reviewed
each case to determine whether the decisive factor was that the
victorious party was first to reduce to practice, that the victorious
party was first to conceive but last to reduce to practice, 57 that the
53. As noted infra Table 2, junior and senior filers wait roughly the same
amount of time after reducing an invention to practice before filing a patent
application. So there is no systematic difference between junior and senior filers in
how long they delay filing and therefore no reason to believe it will be easier for
junior than senior filers to shorten the period of delay.
54. It may be reasonable to suppose that small inventors are less likely to file
abroad than large inventors and therefore that they have less incentive to file early
currently. Under a first-to-file system, small inventors may accelerate their filing
more than large inventors. This theory seems plausible, but it has trouble
explaining Mossinghofff’s finding that small inventors are no more likely than
large inventors to be first to invent but last to file. See infra note 16 and
accompanying text.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996).
56. For example, one leading patent law casebook devotes seventy-eight pages
to priority disputes, compared with twenty-three pages for claim construction and
six pages for literal infringement. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY : CASES AND M ATERIALS 439-515, 533-535 (priority), 878-84
(literal infringement), 884-907 (claim construction) (3d ed. 2002).
57. In such a case the victorious party must also prove its diligence from a time
immediately prior to the other party’s reduction to practice. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2)
(1996).

405180

5/9/2003 5:21 PM

March 2003]

PATENT PRIORITY RULES

17

losing party was not diligent, 58 that the losing party abandoned its
work, 59 or a reason unrelated to priority. The results are presented in
Table 2.
TABLE 2
GROUNDS FOR WINNING PRIORITY CONTEST
BASIS Tot Non- Firs First to Other
Other Inventors
OF
al prior t to Concei Party’s Party
hip
WIN Cas
ity RT ve, Last Lack Abando Mistake/
STAT
es Basi
P
to RTP
of
n,
Other
S
s
diligen Suppres
ce
s
Concea
l
All
118
26
60
9
12
7
2
Cases
Clean 100
23
54
5
11
6
0
Winn
er
Jr.
33
0
25
2
3
3
0
Winn
er
Sr.
67
23
29
3
8
3
0
Winn
er
Sr.
44
29
3
8
3
0
Winn
er
exclu
ding
nonpr
iority
All 100
Cases %
Clean 85
Winn
%
er

22%
23%

52
%
55
%

8%

10%

6%

2%

5%

11%

6%

0%

58. Section 102(g)(2) provides that a party who is first to conceive, but last to
reduce to practice, will be deemed the first inventor only if it was diligent in
reducing the invention to practice from a time prior to the other party’s conception.
Id.
59. Actually, the test is whether the party “abandoned, suppressed or
concealed” its invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). Id.

No
Basi
s

2
1
0
1
1
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0%

76
%

6%

9%

9%

0%

35%

44
%

5%

12%

5%

0%

-

67
%

7%

19%

7%

0%

There is virtually no difference in why junior and senior parties
win priority disputes. The only exception is diligence. Senior
parties are significantly more likely to win by proving their opponent
dilatory than the reverse. In theory this outcome should not be
surprising, given that junior parties generally have a longer period of
delay to explain in circumstances where diligence is relevant. But
the data in Table 3 show that the difference is minor: on average,
senior parties spent 14 months between conception and reduction to
practice, while junior parties spent 15 months.
Table 3
TIME DIFFERENCES IN PRIORITY CONTESTS ( IN MONTHS )
AVERAGE # of Avg. Avg. Sr. Avg. Jr. Differe Differe
TIME
Cas Sr.
Concept Concept nce in nce in
DIFFEREN es
Filed ion
v. ion
v. RTP
Concep
CES
IN
ate v. RTP
RTP
Dates
tion
PRIORITY
Sr.
Dates
CONTESTS
RTP
Cases
22
2360
where Sr.
Party
Prove Alt
RTP and
filedate

60. While it seems curious that senior parties wait an average of almost two
years after reducing to practice before filing their patent application, in fact this is
a statistical anomaly caused by one case in which the senior party waited more
than ten years to file its application. If we exclude that case from the dataset, the
average drops to a more reasonable fifteen months.
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27

-

14

-

-

-

21

-

-

15

-

-

52

-

-

-

13

-

64

-

-

-

12

-

12

-

-

-

-

8

At least part of the explanation may be attributable to the “oneway” nature of diligence: only the diligence of the first to conceive
but last to reduce to practice matters under the statute. 61 While both
61. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); See, e.g., Steinberg v. Seitz, 517 F.2d 1359, 1364
(C.C.P.A. 1975); 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT §10.03[1][a] (2002).

405180

20

5/9/2003 5:21 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54]

junior and senior parties may be in this position, junior parties are
more likely to be last to reduce to practice, since they were last to
file. Thus, there may simply be more cases in which the junior
party’s diligence is at issue than cases that consider the senior party’s
diligence.
A more important finding is that the overwhelming majority of
priority disputes are won or lost merely by relying on proof of
reduction to practice. 29 out of 44 (or 67%) of senior parties
prevailed by showing nothing more than reduction to practice, and
many of these prevailed on the basis of their filing date. 62 Even more
striking, 25 of 33 (or 76%) of junior applicants who won did not
62. Indeed, as Table 6 demonstrates, in many cases prevailing parties did not
even present evidence of conception or reduction to practice other than the filing
date.
TABLE 6
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY W INNERS IN PRIORITY CONTESTS
Analysis F: How Total
Filedate More
Filedate
Filedate + Filedate +
much evidence Cases
Only
than just +
Alt Conceptio Conceptio
did parties need
Filedate
RTP
n Only
n + RTP
to win? (Stats)
Only
Sr. True Priority
NonForeign
Winners
34
18
16
6
6
4
Total
RTP
More
RTP
+
Cases
Only
than RTP Concepti
on
Jr. True Priority
NonForeign
29
21
8
8
Winners
(Percentages)

Sr. True Priority
NonForeign
Winners

Jr. True Priority
NonForeign
Winners

Filedate
Only

More
than just
Filedate

Filedate
+
Alt
RTP
Only

Filedate +
Conceptio
n Only

Filedate +
Conceptio
n + RTP

53%
RTP
Only

47%
More
than RTP

18%
RTP
+
Concepti
on

18%

12%

72%

28%

28%
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need to prove anything more than their date of reduction to practice.
All the other grounds for resolving priority contests were minor by
comparison. Junior applicants won 2 cases (6%) on the basis of their
own diligence, 3 cases (9%) on the basis of the senior party’s lack of
diligence, and 3 cases (9%) on the basis of the senior party’s
abandonment, suppression or concealment of the invention.
Similarly, senior applicants won 3 cases (7%) on the basis of their
own diligence, 8 cases (19%) on the basis of the senior party’s lack
of diligence, and 3 cases (7%) on the basis of the senior party’s
abandonment, suppression, or concealment of the invention. Given
the small number of cases in which proof of conception, diligence,
abandonment, suppression, and concealment actually matters to the
outcome, and given the detailed factual nature of those inquiries, the
net benefit of the detailed U.S. priority rules is open to question.
Many of the priority disputes are resolved on the basis of the filing
dates themselves. Indeed, our analysis suggests that in more than
half of the cases in which the senior party won a priority contest, and
more than a third of total cases, the senior party needed to do no
more than prove its filing date, suggesting that the entire proceeding
was a waste of time. 63 Many more can be resolved by proof of

63. Our data for this finding are taken from the subset of cases in which neither
party was a foreign inventor. We imposed this limitation because for cases with
invention dates before 1996 – virtually all of the cases in our study – foreign
patentees were barred from proving conception and reduction to practice outside
the U.S. Inclusion of foreign cases would have artificially skewed the number of
parties who relied solely on their filing date. There were sixty-three such cases.
The senior party won thirty-four and the junior party twenty-nine. Of those thirtyfour, eighteen were won by relying on no more than the filing date and another six
by the senior party proving their date of reduction to practice. The complete data
for this subset are included here as Table 5.
TABLE 5
RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC PRIORITY DISPUTES
Evidence Stats
Total
Jr. Winner Sr. Winner
Cases
Non-foreign
Not 63
29
34
nonpriority Clear (“Good”)
Cases
Sr. Party rely on Filedate
only (1)
Sr. Party Prove Alt RTP
only (2)

29

11

18

9

3

6
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reduction to practice, without inquiring further. So even if the
United States were to retain a first to invent system, the data suggest
it could get most of the benefit of that system by looking only at
evidence of reduction to practice. 64 Further, eliminating proof of
Sr. Party Prove Conception
but not Alt RTP (3)

15

9

6

Sr. Party Prove Conception
and Alt RTP (4)

11

7

4

Jr. Party Rely on RTP Only
(5)
Jr. Party Prove Conception
and RTP (6)

46

21

25

17

8

9

Evidence %

Total
Cases
63%

Jr. Winner

Sr. Winner

46%

54%

46%

38%

62%

Sr. Party Prove Alt RTP
only
Sr. Party Prove Conception
but not Alt RTP

14%

33%

67%

24%

60%

40%

Sr. Party Prove Conception
and Alt RTP

17%

64%

36%

Jr. Party Rely on RTP

73%

46%

54%

Jr. Party Prove Conception
and RTP

27%

47%

53%

Non-foreign
Not
nonpriority Clean Cases
Sr. Party rely on Filedate
only

64. Indeed, one commentator has proposed just such a system. Sean T.
Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes – A Proposed Redefinition of “First-toInvent”, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 755 (1998).
One argument against relying solely on the reduction to practice standard is the
problem of “spurring.” It may be that inventors who fail to patent or
commercialize their invention for a number of years will be spurred to file a patent
application when they see others who have developed independently the idea to
obtain their own patent. Under existing law, the work of a first inventor will not
bar a subsequent inventor from getting a patent if the first inventor has
“abandoned” or “suppressed” the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). If the law
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conception, diligence, abandonment, suppression and concealment
would not disadvantage junior applicants, since they are no more
likely – indeed, somewhat less likely – than senior applicants to
benefit from such evidence. But it would reduce much of the cost of
interferences, particularly 102(g) judicial proceedings, since parties
to a court case will investigate and prepare their proof for all these
issues even in cases in which the court does not need to rely on that
evidence. 65
Eliminating use of such evidence will also relieve courts of the
burden of evaluating particularly difficult concepts such as state of
mind (which is relevant to both diligence and abandonment) and
acceptable periods of delay. 66 Filing dates and reductions to practice
tend to be objective facts that can be determined by documentary or
physical evidence. By contrast, proof of conception and diligence
requires some inquiry into what an inventor thought and when they
thought it. It therefore tends to rely at least in part on the memories
of the inventors and their compatriots, and those memories can be

excluded evidence of abandonment or suppression from 102(g), it is possible that
these first inventors could defeat the subsequent inventor in a priority dispute by
proving they were first to reduce the invention to practice.
We are not persuaded that spurring will occur in a significant number of
cases or that it should necessarily be viewed as a problem when it does occur.
Section 102(c) already provides that the first inventor in such a situation could not
obtain its own patent. So, the only circumstance in which spurring would arise is
when an infringement defendant – perhaps the first inventor itself – tries to defeat
the patent granted to a second inventor. In such a case, it is not clear that a second
inventor should be entitled to patent something in fact invented by another who has
kept that invention secret. For a detailed discussion of one case where the problem
has arisen with regard to computer software, see M ARK A . LEMLEY ET AL.,
SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 334-40 (1st ed. 2000).
65. Priority disputes occur only between two bona fide inventors. In some
circumstances a putative inventor will claim that his idea has been stolen by
another who patented it. For an egregious case of such theft, see Univ. of Colo.
Found. Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Such cases
will of course require inquiry into the details of inventorship. But, they will be
resolved under 35 U.S.C. section 102(f), which covers derivation, or by correction
of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. section 256. They do not justify collecting
subjective evidence in true priority disputes.
66. See Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need So Many Mental and Emotional
States in United States Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP . L.J. 279, 290 (2000)
(challenging the idea that invention should depend on subjective mental state); cf.
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in Patent
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799 (2002) (questioning the wisdom of requiring
proof of mental state in patent infringement cases).
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biased or simply lost years later. 67
The one significant use of such evidence in the existing cases is
actually a benefit to senior applicants. Junior applicants who win are
more likely than senior applicants to win through proof of their own
efforts, rather than the other party’s lapse. 68 These results are
illustrated in Table 4.
TABLE 4
NATURE OF VICTORY: BY AFFIRMATIVE EFFORTS OR THE
FAILURE OF OPPONENTS
DEFAULT
Total
Win by Win by
WINNER STATS Cases
own
other’s
efforts
lapse
True Priority 76
59
17
Contests
Jr. Winner
33
27
6
Sr. Winner
43
32
11

DEFAULT
WINNER %

Total
Cases

True Priority 100%
Contests
Jr. Winner
43%
Sr. Winner
57%

Win by
own
efforts
78%

Win by
other’s
lapse
22%

82%
74%

18%
26%

Junior winners prevail 82% of the time on the basis of their own
67. Indeed, the problem with relying on inventor testimony is so great that the
Federal Circuit has created an evidentiary rule requiring claims of inventorship by
non-patentees to be corroborated. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). The normal sort of corroborating evidence is a contemporaneous
laboratory notebook, but the corroboration requirement can be satisfied by the
testimony of other witnesses, as well as by circumstantial evidence. Id. So, the
evidentiary rule does not do away with the problem of evaluating inventor and
witness credibility. On the rather intricate rules for corroborating claims of
inventorship in interference proceedings, see Michael F. Ciraolo, Application of
the Corroboration Requirement to Interference Proceedings and Other Sections of
102, __ J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFC. SOC’Y 531 (2002).
68. We define victory by proof of one’s own efforts as victory based on
evidence that an applicant was first to reduce to practice or was first to conceive
but last to reduce to practice and was diligent in reducing to practice. We define
victory by the lapse of the other party as victory based on an opponent’s lack of
diligence or their abandonment, suppression or concealment.
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affirmative proof and 18% of the time because of the senior party’s
lapse. Senior winners prevail 74% of the time on the basis of their
own affirmative proof and 26% of the time because of the junior
party’s lapse. While the differences are not striking – both parties
clearly tend to prevail on the basis of their own efforts – they are
intuitive. Because senior applicants by definition filed first, juniors
will on average have a longer delay to explain, making it somewhat
less likely that they can prove diligence or continued working for
that longer period. This fact may justify retaining a diligence or nonabandonment standard. But it is worth noting that if the U.S. does
retain the current approach, the effect will be to protect senior rather
than junior applicants.
(3) Small Inventors
Since small inventors – and particularly individual inventors –
have led the fight against patent harmonization, it seems particularly
important to determine whether small inventors in fact benefit from
the first to invent system. An important recent study by Gerald
Mossinghoff addresses this issue in detail. Mossinghoff studied all
2,858 interference decisions between 1983 and 2000 in order to
determine whether small inventors were really more likely to prevail
in priority disputes. 69 He found that the first to invent system did not
benefit small inventors on average. Of the 2,858 interferences, 203
were decided in favor of a small junior party; Mossinghoff defined
these 203 as small inventors benefiting from the system. 70 But 201
more interferences were decided adverse to a small senior party, 71
suggesting that small entities neither gain nor lose on average from
using the system. Indeed, Mossinghoff found that individual
inventors, who have most strongly advocated the interference
69. Mossinghofff, supra note 19. The PTO began charging reduced fees to
small inventors in 1983. This creates a means of tracking the size of inventors. An
entity is defined by the PTO as “small” if it meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §
41(h)(1), which incorporates by reference section three of the Small Business Act.
Small inventors as defined by the PTO fall into three categories: individuals, small
businesses, and non-profit organizations. 35 U.S.C. § 41. While many of the nonprofits are in fact quite large, non-profits as a whole represent only about one
percent of all patents issued. Most small inventors are either individuals (17.5% of
all patents) or small businesses (10.7% of all patents). John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution,
53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000).
70. Mossinghofff, supra note 19 at 427-28. 738 large junior entities also
prevailed in an interference.
71. Id. 740 large senior entities also lost interference proceedings.
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system, actually lost more from the system than they gained. 72
We have not sought to replicate the results of Mossinghoff’s
comprehensive study. We did study one other aspect of the dispute
that has relevance, however: on whose behalf the interference
proceeding was initiated. 73 Initiation matters because it is the party
on whose behalf the interference is being initiated (whether by the
party itself provoking an interference or by the patent examiner
declaring the interference) who might be thought to be the one who
stands to benefit from the interference system. Ordinarily that would
be the junior party. But in more than half of the cases, the
interference appears to have been initiated on behalf of the senior
party – the one with the earlier filing date. This can occur where the
junior party’s patent has already issued, and the senior party
provokes an interference, or where the party on whose behalf the
interference is initiated in fact can claim priority to an earlier-filed
application, making them the senior party. Our results are reported
in Table 5.
TABLE 5
WHO INITIATES I NTERFERENCES BY ENTITY SIZE
INITIATOR
AND Tot
Entiti Small/
Nonpro Other/Lar
STATUS STATS
al
es
Independ fit
ge
Cas w/Sta ent
es
tus
Data
74

All Cases
190
Cases Initiated for 92
Jr. Party
Status of Jr. Party -

86

42

4

40

36

9

2

25

72. Id. (98 individual junior inventors won their interferences, while 115
individual senior inventors lost their interferences). For a non-statistical argument
along the same lines, see Jackman, supra note 38, at 83-84 arguing that
interferences disadvantage small inventors because of their cost and delay.
73. We applied the following rules to determine on whose behalf the
interference was being initiated: 1) in contests pitting one application against
another application, the interference was initiated on behalf of the applicant with
the later priority date (the junior applicant), and 2) in contests pitting an application
against a patent, the interference was initiated on behalf of the applicant (junior or
senior applicant). How could the applicant be a senior party in the latter scenario?
As described above, the applicant could conceivably have a priority date senior to
the challenged patent where it is a continuation of an earlier patent application or
issued patent, or simply took longer in prosecution than the challenged patent.
74. There are at least two parties to each interference; so the number of parties
with status data will sometimes exceed the number of interferences.

405180

5/9/2003 5:21 PM

March 2003]

PATENT PRIORITY RULES

Initiator
Status
of
Sr.
Challenged Party
Cases Initiated for
Sr. Party
Status of Sr. Party
Initiator
Status
of
Jr.
Challenged Party
Status
of
All
Initiators

27

-

50

33

2

15

98

153

38

7

109

-

58

8

3

47

-

95

30

4

62

-

94

17

5

72

Status
of
All Challenged Parties

145

63

6

77

INITIATOR
STATUS %

Cases
w/Sta
tus
Data*
-

Small

Nonpro
fit

Other/Lar
ge

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

39%

25%

6%

69%

54%

66%

4%

30%

-

-

-

-

59%

14%

5%

81%

97%

32%

4%

65%

-

18%

5%

77%

-

43%

4%

53%

Tot
al
Cas
es
All Cases
100
%
CASES INITIATED 48
FOR J R. PARTY
%
Status of Jr. Party Initiator
Status
of
Sr. Challenged Party
CASES INITIATED 52
FOR SR. PARTY
%
Status of Sr. Party Initiator
Status
of
Jr. Challenged Party
Status
of
All Initiators
Status
of
All Challenged Parties
AND
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The results are striking. Of the 94 initiating parties for which
status data were available, 75 only 17 (or 18%) were individuals or
small businesses, while 72 (77%) were large entities. 76 By contrast,
of the 145 respondents in an interference for which data was
available, 63 (or 43%) were individuals or small businesses, while 77
(53%) were large entities. 77 These findings are significant because
they suggest that interference proceedings are more often used by
large entities to challenge the priority of small entities, not the
reverse. This evidence further supports Mossinghoff’s conclusion
that the first to invent system is not working to the benefit of small
entities. If anything, small entities are getting bogged down in
interference proceedings initiated by larger companies. This makes
some intuitive sense. Large, sophisticated entities are more likely to
understand the patent system, including the rather arcane interference
process, and use it to their advantage. Small entities tend to be less
sophisticated about patents, and may not take full advantage of
interferences. 78
(4) Simultaneous Invention
By definition, priority disputes arise when two or more parties
claim to have invented the same thing. One of the striking factors in
our dataset, though, is just how close the invention dates appear to
be. We compared the dates of reduction to practice for the senior
and junior inventors in cases in which both parties proved reduction
to practice and in which we had dates reported by the court. 79 There
75. As noted above, only some of the small entity status data was available to
us. In most cases, the entity size data was available only for winners, because only
winners had patents issued.
76. The remaining five (5%) were non-profits. While non-profits are classed as
small entities for purposes of PTO fees, all the non-profits in our sample were in
fact large universities. Thus, we have chosen to include them neither in the small
nor the large categories.
77. Six (4%) were non-profits.
78. See Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193, 22728 (1990). Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New
Frontiers Addison C. Harris Lecture (Nov. 9, 2000) in 76 IND. L.J. 803, 815
(2001) (noting that the first-to-invent rule is an odd way to favor small inventors,
since any inventor can benefit from it and “the sheer war of attrition that this rule
invites should dissuade all but the hardiest to favor it.”).
79. In some cases, the adjudicator’s opinion was not specific as to the date of
reduction to practice. Where the adjudicator specified a month but no day, we
have arbitrarily assumed that that invention occurred on the mid-point of the
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were 58 such cases when we included foreign applicants, and 47
when we excluded foreign applicants.
The dates of reduction to practice are quite close. In fully 45%
of the cases in both datasets, the senior and junior applicants first
reduced to practice within 6 months of each other. In 70% of the
cases they reduced to practice within a year of each other. Similarly,
a chart showing the difference in conception dates in the 11 cases
where both parties proved conception shows that in more than 45%
of the cases, the parties conceived within 6 months of each other, and
that 70% conceived within a year of each other. These results are
presented in Table 7 and depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
TABLE 7
DIFFERENCES IN PRIORITY DATES (IN MONTHS)
PRIORITY N
1
6
1
18
24
24
CONTEST
mont month year month month month
STATS IN
h or s
or or
s
or s
or s
or
BUCKETS
less
less
less less
less
more
(SHARE OF
CASES
RESOLVED
IN. . .)

RTP
v. 47
RTP
excluding
nonpriorit
y
and
foreign
RTP
v. 58
RTP
excluding
nonpriorit
y only
Difference 11
in
Conceptio
n Dates

4%

45%

70
%

83%

87%

13%

3%

47%

74
%

84%

90%

10%

18%

45%

73
%

91%

91%

9%

Figure 1

month. In a few cases, the adjudicator said nothing more specific than “party x
proved reduction to practice on or before date y.” We have excluded those cases
from the analysis in this section.
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Differences in Reduction-to-Practice Dates of Inventorship
100%

90%
84%

80%
Share of Cases

74%
60%

47%
40%

20%

0%
N = 58*

Under
6 Months

Under
12 Months

Under
18 Months

Under
24 Months

RTP v. RTP Dates
*Includes all cases where 2 precise RTP dates provided, e.g. excludes interferences won on the basis of a lack of
identical inventorship and interferenes where only imprecise dates (i.e. "before 3/4/82) were provided.

FIGURE 2
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Differences in Conception Dates of Inventorship
100%

91%

91%

80%

Share of Cases

73%
60%

45%
40%

20%

0%

N = 11*

Under
6 Months

Under
12 Months

Under
18 Months

Under
24 Months

Conception v. Conception Dates
*Includes all cases where 2 precise conception dates provided.

These results provide some support for the idea that
simultaneous or near-simultaneous invention is a regular feature of
innovation. 80 But we caution against reading too much into the data.
80. For a discussion of “patent races” resulting from near-simultaneous
invention, see, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884 (1990). For an example
of simultaneous invention, see e.g., Spitting Image, ECONOMIST , Sept. 21, 2002, at
21:
The thermal inkjet printer was invented not once, but twice. The idea was
conceived simultaneously, and unbeknown to one another, by two competing
teams on either side of the Pacific. In Japan, Ichiro Endo, an engineer at Canon,
noticed ink squirting from the neck of a syringe when a hot soldering iron touched
it. Thousands of miles away at Hewlett-Packard's laboratories in Silicon Valley, a
researcher called John Vaught dreamed up his version of the thermal inkjet by
borrowing from the mechanism of the coffee
percolator.... Two years later, Hewlett-Packard found out about Canon's work. The
patents for many of the key inventions in both research efforts had been filed
within months of one another.
Id.
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One problem is that priority disputes are self-selecting. Since
priority disputes tend to arise when two or more parties file patent
applications at close to the same point in time, perhaps it should not
be surprising that those cases show remarkably similar dates of
invention. Further, if the Priest/Klein hypothesis 81 has any validity, a
litigation selection effect may be at work: the cases that actually
make it to court may be those in which the dates are close enough
that the outcome is unclear. 82
Even taking such selection biases into account, the closeness of
invention dates is striking. It may suggest that the U.S. first to invent
system is not particularly “fairer” than a first to file alternative, since
regardless of who wins, the loser is an independent inventor who will
likely have made substantial investment in developing its invention
before learning of another party’s priority. 83 A fairer system might
seek to allocate some rights to both parties in a case of roughly
simultaneous invention. One such approach is the European system
of prior user rights, under which those who independently develop an
invention get a limited right to continue using it even after another
party’s patent issues. 84 Another alternative would be to create a
81. See supra, notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
82. By contrast, we reject another suggestion – that litigants don’t go to great
effort to prove dates of conception or reduction to practice earlier than they need to
win -- since the cost of proving the earliest date of reduction to practice is unlikely
to be much greater than the cost of proving an intermediate date.
83. Epstein, supra note 78, at 815 (suggesting that the cost of an interference
system is not justified given the simultaneity of many inventions).
Cases in which one party takes the idea from another present a different
issue, of course. But 35 U.S.C. section 102(f) prevents such derivation without the
need for a priority dispute. In addition, patent law rules against inequitable
conduct, see generally J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc. 747 F.2d 1553
(Fed. Cir. 1984), and other laws such as fraud and even antitrust may come into
play in such a case. Cf. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (antitrust cause of action for fraudulent procurement of
a patent); but see Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.
1984) (Walker Process fraud does not apply to disputes over who owns an
invention). For a full discussion of such claims, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
IP AND A NTITRUST : A N A NALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 11.2 (2003).
84. For a discussion of prior user rights, see, e.g., Prior Use Rights: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. and the Admin. of Justice, H.R., 102d Cong.,
127 (1994) (statement of Robert Merges); John Neukom, A Prior Use Right for the
Community Patent Convention, 5 EUR. INTELL . PROP . REV. 165 (1990); Lisa M.
Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and
Patent Law Harmonization: An Analysis and Proposal, 72 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK
OFFICE . SOC’Y 523 (1990).
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defense to patent infringement for independent invention, so that
patent law tracked copyright and trade secret law. 85 This would be a
somewhat more radical departure from the existing patent rules,
though it has been proposed by a number of commentators. 86 But
under current law, a priority contest remains a winner-take-all game,
no matter how close the score.
(5) Discrimination
The U.S. patent priority rules have long discriminated against
foreign inventors. 87 Until 1994 only inventive activity in the U.S.
counted for priority; 88 foreigners who could not show they invented
in the U.S. – or at least that they had brought their invention into the
country89 —had to rely on their filing date for priority. 90 As a result,
85. Copyright and trade secret both punish only those who acquire the work
from another – “copying” or “misappropriating” it. See, e.g., M ERGES, supra note
56, at 23, 27.
86. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The IndependentInvention Defense in Intellectual Property, __ ECONOMICA __ (forthcoming 2002);
Michelle Armond, Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to
Patent Preliminary Injunctions, 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); John S.
Leibovitz, Note:Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251
(2002); Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of
Efficient Infringement, 86 CAL. L. RE V. 179 (1998). Cf. Roger D. Blair & Thomas
F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 799 (2002) (arguing that the rules relating to patent marking and willfulness
effectively create such a system already).
87. In addition to the priority rules discussed here, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (b)
(1996) (both providing that certain types of prior art are relevant only if they exist
“in this country”).
Anecdotal evidence suggests another sort of anti-foreign bias: that courts are likely
to favor domestic rather than foreign parties in litigation. For different efforts to
evaluate the existence of this bias, compare Allison & Lemley, Empirical
Evidence, supra note 48, at 224-27 (finding that foreign patents are actually more
likely than domestic patents to be held valid in court but noting the selection bias
that might occur because so few foreign patents are actually litigated) with
Kimberly Pace Moore, Xenophobia, Patents and Courts, (working paper 2002)
(arguing that the data show greater bias against foreigners than generally assumed).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1993).
89. In cases where an invention was made abroad but later brought into the
U.S., the U.S. priority date was the date of first action in the U.S. Holmwood v.
Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Breuer v. DeMarinis, 558 F.2d
22, 28 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Even transporting the idea – coming to a conference in
the U.S. while in possession of papers containing the idea, say – could count as
conception in the U.S. under this rule. See, e.g., In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 1543
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (receipt of written application in U.S. was date of U.S. conception,
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they were at a significant disadvantage in proving priority in an
interference against a domestic opponent. 91 That anti-foreign bias
was reduced in 1994 and again in 1999, when U.S. law changed in
compliance with TRIPs to permit a patent applicant to prove
inventive activity in any WTO member country. 92 The bias was not
completely eliminated, however. 93 Further, since the change in the
law did not permit proof of foreign inventive activity occurring
before 1996, all of the cases involving a foreign inventor in our study
were decided under the old law.
Somewhat to our surprise, we found no evidence of such a
disadvantage to foreigners in our data. Of the 76 “clean” cases in our
sample that involved pure priority disputes, 14 involved one or more
parties who invented abroad. Table 8 reports the results of those
cases.
TABLE 8

even though no work on the idea was done here).
90. The Paris Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty permits foreign
applicants to rely on a foreign filing date for U.S. priority so long as the
application is “converted” into a U.S. patent application within a certain period of
time. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4, 21 U.S.T.
1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6295, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (1970 revision); Patent Cooperation
Treaty ch. 2, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. NO. 8733 (1978). See generally, supra note
56, at 454-57.
91. For example, in Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1996), the senior party was prevented from relying on proof of its first inventive
activity because that activity occurred overseas. It, therefore, lost the priority
dispute to the junior party, whose inventive activity occurred in the U.S. [check]
92. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2001); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
93. Several areas of disparate treatment remained. First, the law was effective
only for proof of priority dates beginning in 1996. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2003).
Second, it did not apply to non-WTO countries. Id. Finally, only patent applicants
could prove inventive activity abroad under the 1994 rules. Proof of foreign
inventive activity could not be used defensively, to show that someone else was
entitled to a patent. This resulted from the fact that Congress amended section 104
to allow proof of foreign activity in acquiring a patent, but did not amend section
102(g), which disentitled an applicant to a patent only if the identical invention
was made “in this country” by another. Id. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). The latter rule was
changed somewhat in 1999 when Congress permitted defensive use of foreign
inventive activity in PTO interference proceedings but not in judicial proceedings
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INTERFERENCES INVOLVING FOREIGNERS
FOREIGN APPLICANT

# of

STATS/%

Cas

Priority,

es

1

% of True

Foreigne

Priority, 1

r cases

Foreigner cases

Clean Nonpriority

%

# True

14

-

12

-

7

50

7

58%

5

42%

-

-

Cases involving
Foreign Inventive
Activity
Where the
foreigner won
Where the

%
5

foreigner lost
Other (both
foreigners)

36
%

2

14
%

Of these 14, two cases involved disputes between two different
foreign entities, who were presumably at a roughly equal
disadvantage. Of the 12 remaining cases that pitted a foreign
challenging the validity of a patent. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) with §
102(g)(2).
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inventor against a domestic inventor, foreign inventors won 7 times
(or 58%). This suggests that the old rules discriminating against
foreign activity did not have the systematic effect of disadvantaging
foreign applicants in priority disputes.
We urge substantial caution in relying on this data, however,
both because of the small number of cases involved and because a
selection effect may be at work here as well. Patent litigation data
clearly indicates that foreign patent owners are much less likely to
sue for infringement than domestic patent owners. 94 A similar
reluctance may be at work in interference proceedings. One
explanation for this discrepancy is that foreign patentees choose to
litigate only their best cases. If so, the fact that foreign patentees win
a majority of the priority contests in which they participate may
mask the discriminatory effect of the old statute.
(6) Appeals
Of the 34 final Federal Circuit decisions on 102(g) issues
between 1991 and 2001, 30 were “clean” cases with clear outcomes.
In those cases, the Federal Circuit ruled in favor of the senior party in
14 cases (47%) and in favor of the junior party in 16 cases (53%).
These results are presented in Table 1, above. One might initially
suppose from this statistic that the Federal Circuit rather strongly
favored junior inventors. In fact, however, we think the explanation
lies in the significant deference the Federal Circuit gave to the triers
of fact on priority issues. The Federal Circuit was quite likely to
affirm rulings by any finder of fact; it affirmed in 25 of the 30 cases,
or 83%. The Federal Circuit gave significantly more deference to
district court decisions than to BPAI decisions, however, as Table 9
demonstrates.
TABLE 9
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AFFIRM /O VERTURN RATES OF BPAI AND DISTRICT
COURT
PRIORITY DECISIONS

94. Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note 48, at 224-27; Moore,
Xenophobia, supra note 87.
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DECISIONS

Tot

Affir

Rever

Affirm Revers

Affir

Rever

BELOW

al

m

se

Dist

e Dist

m

se

STATS

Cas

BPA

BPAI

Ct

Ct

Tota

Total

es

I

True

l

27

6

3

16

2

22

5

12

3

2

6

1

9

3

15

3

1

10

1

13

2

30

7

3

18

2

25

5

Priority
Clean
Apellate
Cases
Validity/Sr.
Winner
Below
Invalidity/Jr
. Winner
Below
Clean
Appellate
Cases
(including
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405180

March 2003]

5/9/2003 5:21 PM

PATENT PRIORITY RULES

39

court decisions (90%). Interestingly, the court’s greater deference to
district court decisions does not appear merely to be a function of the
presumption of validity. The Federal Circuit affirmed ten out of
eleven district court opinions ruling for the junior applicant, and in
all those cases affirmance involved holding the senior party’s patent
invalid. So it is deference to the district court’s resolution of the
complicated factual questions surrounding priority, not simply
adherence to the presumption of validity, that best explains these
results.
This deference is significant. The Federal Circuit has often been
accused of “judicial hyperactivity,” or acting as a trial court by
reexamining facts at will and failing to show proper deference to the
judgments of the district court. 95 But our data suggest the opposite –
at least in the case of priority disputes, the Federal Circuit is showing
remarkable reliance on factfinding by the district courts.
(7) PTO vs. Court Decisions
One curious fact about our litigation dataset is that a significant
majority of the priority cases litigated to judgment were challenges to
the validity of a patent in court, not interference proceedings in the
PTO. Of the 100 “clean” cases in our study, 26 were BPAI
decisions, 44 were district court or ITC decisions, and 30 were
Federal Circuit decisions. Of the 30 appellate decisions, 20 were
appeals from district courts, and 10 were appeals from the BPAI.
Thus, only 36 out of 100 decisions resulted from interference
proceedings. In almost two-thirds of the cases in which priority was
at issue, it was raised for the first time in infringement litigation after
the patent had already issued.
There are two possible explanations for this. First, it may be
that the infringement-related 102(g) issues involve claims of priority
by third parties who never filed a patent application. Infringement
defendants have a substantial incentive to find prior inventors and
introduce evidence of their work. That evidence would likely never
be found by the PTO during the ordinary examination process.
Based on our data, in about 65% of the non-BPAI cases (34 out of 52
true priority appellate and district court cases), the junior party did
not rely on a patent or patent application (their own or another’s) to
challenge the senior party’s patent.
Second, even if both inventors filed a patent application, it may
be that the PTO is not doing a very good job of identifying conflicts
between different inventors. In any case in which both the plaintiff
95. William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort With Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
725 (2000).

405180

40

5/9/2003 5:21 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54]

and the defendant obtained a patent on the same invention, for
example, the PTO likely erred in failing to declare an interference. 96
This would be a significant failing, since simultaneous identical
inventions are ones we would expect the PTO to catch. This sort of
failure did not appear to be a major source of cases, however. In our
data set, around 13% of the non-BPAI cases (seven out of 52 true
priority non-BPAI cases) involved two patents covering the same
invention. In either case, the fact that most priority disputes arise in
litigation rather than before the PTO is consistent with Lemley’s
earlier argument that litigation, not examination, is where the system
will weed out bad patents most effectively. 97
III. Conclusions and Policy Implications
What policy conclusions can we draw from all of this? First, the
arguments most commonly made both for and against the U.S. first
to invent system have little basis in fact.
Advocates of a first to file system claim that priority disputes
waste significant time and money without changing outcomes.
These claims are incorrect. Interference proceedings and 102(g)
invalidity claims do affect the results in a significant number of
cases. Further, while the percentage of patent applications that
involve a priority dispute is quite small, it is no smaller – and indeed
somewhat larger – than the percentage of patents that are ever
enforced. One can no more say that the small number of priority
disputes doesn’t matter than one would argue that litigated cases of
infringement don’t matter to the patent system. Interferences and
judicial priority disputes do play a significant role in determining
who gets a patent.
Second, there is the question of cost. There can be no doubt that
the U.S. system is more expensive to administer than a first to file
system would be, both in money and in time 98 (though we have not
96. The only alternative explanation is that one party obtained a patent, the
other party saw the patent and provoked an interference by filing its own identical
application, and the provoking party later won the interference and had a patent
issued in its own name.
Once patents have issued to both parties, the BPAI no longer has
jurisdiction to resolve priority disputes. See JD v. SH, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1468 (Bd.
Pat. App. & Int. 2001).
97. Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 40.
98. Patent litigation as a whole is extremely expensive. The median case costs
$1.5 million per side in legal fees to take to trial. Id. at 1502. Not all of this
expense is attributable to priority disputes, of course, and presumably in some
cases the litigation would have been just as expensive without the priority issue.
Interferences are less expensive but still may cost $500,000 on average.
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studied the cost issue directly). But the cost savings may be
overstated. As we have seen, a significant percentage of the priority
disputes actually litigated are not interferences, but challenges to the
validity of an issued patent based on third party prior art. A first to
file system might not eliminate this class of cases, since proof that
someone else invented the patented technology first but chose not to
patent it calls into doubt the grounds for issuing a patent. If 102(g)
challenges based on third party art are permitted to continue, the cost
savings from a first to file system would be substantially reduced.
Advocates of the first to invent system claim that the system is
fairer because it identifies the true inventor and systematically
benefits small inventors. However, the evidence does not support the
conclusion that small inventors – the purported beneficiaries of the
first to invent system – in fact get anything out of the process. If the
continued refusal of the U.S. to harmonize its patent system with the
rest of the world is to be justified, therefore, it must be done on a
different basis than its supposed benefits for small inventors.
Advocates of the first to invent system might point to the
variance in results itself as a justification for the system. After all, if
a first to file system picks the “wrong” inventor in a significant
number of cases, that fact may be a justification for retaining the
system regardless of whether the system is biased against any
particular group of inventors. This is fair enough as far as it goes.
But the virtually simultaneous nature of many of the inventions at
issue in priority contests suggests to us that regardless of who wins,
no sort of winner-take-all system is particularly equitable in many
cases. Rather, some sort of divided entitlement – or perhaps a robust
prior user right – would more fairly account for the independent
development of the same idea by two or more parties at about the
http://www.aipla.org/committees/reports/patrel_uspto.html (data reported by
Administrative Patent Judge Torczon). For a lower estimate, see William
Kingston, Is the United States Right about ‘First-to-Invent’?, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP .
REV. 223 (1992) (citing interferences cost over $100,000); Macedo, supra note __,
at 193 (estimating average cost of an interference that goes to final hearing at
$100,000).
Both interferences and court decisions are also time-consuming.
Interferences spend an average of 30.5 months pending before the PTO, and there
are
certain
infamous
interferences
that
continued
for
decades.
http://www.aipla.org/committees/reports/patrel_uspto.html (data reported by PTO
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences Chief Judge Stoner); Evan I. Schwartz,
Televisionary, WIRED, Apr. 2002, 68, 73 (describing the financial and psychic
costs of the interference proceedings over television). Litigation is also timeconsuming, with cases taking at least two years on average to get to trial and one to
two more years on appeal.
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same time. That such a system can be accommodated within a first
to file regime is amply demonstrated by the European experience. 99
Whether prior user rights or some form of nonexclusive entitlement
is a good idea is a more complex matter, one that requires us to
consider not only fairness but also the economic effects of divided
entitlements to intellectual property rights. There is a robust
literature on this issue, 100 and we do not intend to resolve the
question here. We merely suggest that the fairness argument for the
first to invent system is not particularly strong.
If there is no systematic bias in favor of one group or another in
a first to file system, we might decide as a society that the cost of
“getting it perfect” is simply too great. For example, our evidence
suggests that the overwhelming majority of priority disputes could be
resolved using only evidence of filing dates and dates of reduction to
practice. One alternative short of eliminating the first to invent
system altogether would be to truncate the priority proceedings,
dispensing with the need for parties to prove conception, diligence,
abandonment, suppression or concealment.
Doing so would
certainly simplify the law, and would save a significant fraction of
the cost of interferences, while preserving the outcome of the first to
invent system in most cases. It would also let courts avoid relying on
self-serving testimony regarding conception. It would not, however,
accomplish the goal of harmonizing U.S. law with the rest of the
world. 101
99. Europe has both a first to file rule and a system of prior user rights. H.R.
102d Cong. 127 (testimony of Robert P. Merges), supra note 84.
100. For endorsements of divided entitlements in intellectual property in some
circumstances, see, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. RE V. 75
(1994); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. RE V. 989 (1997); Leibovitz,
supra note 86, at 2268-2272; cf. Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999). For arguments against divided entitlements, albeit
from radically different perspectives, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 M INN. L. REV. 697 (2001)
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. ECON.
265 (1977) (both arguing for strong property rights vested in a single entity that
can coordinate innovation); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI .
698 (1998) (arguing against overly divided property entitlements and in favor of
free use).
101. Of course, first-to-invent versus first-to-file is not the only legal obstacle to
harmonization. U.S. law also differs from foreign laws in its one-year grace
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As usual, the real world is messier than advocates from either
side would have us believe. Our data suggest that the U.S. first to
invent system has a significant effect on outcomes, but that it is not
the effect many people in the debate seem to assume. Our findings
might be thought to support harmonization, or alternatively to
support maintaining the U.S. system, or even to provide support for a
hybrid system. Whatever conclusions one draws, though, it should at
least be one based on data and not merely on speculation.

period, in the absence of prior user rights, in the rules for publication of
applications, in the lack of an effective opposition procedure, and in its willingness
to extend patent term, among other provisions.
More generally, some have suggested that, despite its obvious cost savings,
harmonization is not necessarily a desirable goal for patent law. See, e.g., Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA . J. INT ’L L. 275,
296 (1997) (questioning whether there is a “best” patent law rule for all countries);
John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 685 (2002).

